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PRIVACY AND THE CONSTITUTION
SAMUEL

J. ERVIN, JR.t

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important guarantees in the Bill of Rights is that
of privacy. The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this
right to be implied in each of several amendments to the Constitution.
According to the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, specific guarantees "have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones
of privacy."'
While the Justices in the Griswold case disagreed among themselves about the reach of various amendments as they affected the association of marriage under the Connecticut birth control law, the opinion
of the Court was consistent with many others in which it had found that
privacy is an aspect of life necessary to the enjoyment and exercise of
the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, especially the freedoms
secured by the first, fourth, and fifth amendments.
As early as 1885, in referring to the principles of the fourth and
fifth amendments that had been reflected in the early case of Entick v.
Carrington,2 the Court stated:
[T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It
is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction
of some public offence,-it is the invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.'
In 1928, Mr. Justice Brandeis referred in the following terms to the
broad scope of the protections guaranteed by the fourth and fifth
amendments:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favora-

tUnited States Senator; Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.
'381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citation omitted).
219 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
3
1Boyd v.United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
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ble to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. 'hey knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.'
Congress has received many complaints of governmental invasions
of individual privacy. The variety of practices and policies is limited
only by the ingenuity and creativity of the officials responsible for them.
Their range suggests that there are fashions in follies as in everything
else. They run the gamut from mere aggravations, inconveniences, and
offenses to the sensibilities, to more serious threats to freedom. They
include, but are not limited to, unwarranted surveillance and investigative programs, unauthorized data banks, intrusive questionnaires unnecessary to the needs of government, letter-opening, lie-detectors, psychological tests, unwarranted police entry to dwellings, coercion of public
employees in an effort to promote political programs of the Administration, and requirements to attend psychological sensitivity sessions in
order to change the individual's attitudes toward other individuals and
toward social problems.
On the basis of the complaints received by the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, I have concluded that the great majority
of the grievances which individuals voice today about invasions of privacy are nothing more nor less than violations of constitutional guarantees, especially those contained in the first, fourth, and fifth amendments to the Constitution.
In a dissenting opinion to the Griswold case, Justice Black warned
against the danger of challenging unconstitutional acts on the basis of
common law concepts of privacy. 5 The average man, he stated, is as
concerned about infringements on his liberties whether perpetrated quietly or in public. He agreed that "[t]here are. . . guarantees in certain
specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect
privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities. '"6
However, he cautioned that "[o]ne of the most effective ways of diluting
or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the

'Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
5381 U.S. at 508-10 (1965) (dissenting opinion).

1d. at 508.

1018

NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 50

crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or
words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning." 7
For these reasons, it is helpful to discuss current privacy issues in
the context of freedom of the individual, as it is protected by the Bill of
Rights.
FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Freedom for the individual was bought for us long ago by the
blood, sweat, tears, and prayers of multitudes of men and women, great
and small. The Founding Fathers esteemed it life's supreme value. They
so testified by declaring in the preamble to the Constitution that they
ordained and established that instrument to preserve the blessings of
liberty for themselves and their posterity.
Freedom is hard to win or preserve but easy to lose. The price of
its keeping is eternal vigilance, and this vigilance will be exercised only
by those stout-hearts who love freedom above all things and are always
ready to do battle for it against its enemies, doubt and fear.
Doubt lacks faith in freedom and fear is afraid of freedom. When
doubt and fear prevail, government becomes tyrannous, and people
become tolerant of tyranny.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS

The Founding Fathers apprehended these truths. Moreover, they
were aware that history repeats itself. For these reasons, they knew that
the tyrannies of the past would be attempted in the future in the land
for which they were creating a government; that the government they
were creating would undertake in time of doubt and fear to suppress by
sharp measures exercises of freedom displeasing to it; and that freedom
itself would thereby be put in peril unless it was protected by irrepealable constitutional law. And so the Founding Fathers added the Bill of
Rights to the Constitution to place freedom beyond the reach of any
President or any Congress that might doubt the wisdom of America's
commitment to freedom or that might fear its exercise by Americans.
The aim of the Bill of Rights is aptly described in these words in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
7Jd. at 509.
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from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
be submitted to vote; they deand other fundamental rights may not
8
pend on the outcome of no elections.
A TIME OF DOUBT AND FEAR
Ours is a time of doubt and fear. Certain nations threaten the peace
of the world and the security of our country. Violent crime stalks our
land. In the recent past, riotous mobs have burned and looted in some
of our cities, and disquieting agitators have staged violent, unlawful
demonstrations on public streets and college campuses.
These things have frightened many Americans, including some in
high offices. These Americans have lost faith in America's commitment
to freedom. They demand the abridgment of historic freedoms of our
people and attempt to justify their demand by the plea that there is no
other way to obtain security for our land.
Let us reject this plea with words uttered by William Pitt, the
younger, in the House of Commons in 1783: "Necessity is the plea for
every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it
is the creed of slaves." 9 And let us remind ourselves of the admonition
given to Americans by Benjamin Franklin in even more troublous times:
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.""0
I am not among those who doubt and fear. I hasten to affirm,
however, that I do not view the threat from abroad or the crime at home
with complacency. They present problems of the gravest nature. There
are, however, forthright and rational ways to confront these problems
without abridging basic freedoms.
America will remain the land of the free only if it remains the home
of the brave. Free men can confront the threat to our national security
by keeping their hearts in courage and patience and being prepared to
lift up their hands in strength; and a free society can combat crime
effectively only by affording speedy and fair trials to those charged with
criminal acts and imposing appropriate sentences on the ones who are
A319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
IBARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS

111d. at 422.

496 (14th ed. 1967).
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adjudged guilty. However, Americans of little faith and much fear have
recently manifested their purpose to abridge freedoms guaranteed by the
first and fourth amendments.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first example of this abridgment of constitutional freedoms can
be found in President Nixon's recent Executive Order No. 11605,11
which undertakes to give the Subversive Activities Control Board new
sweeping powers to label various organizations or groups as intellectually or politically dangerous. An appreciation of the true effect of this
order requires first an appreciation of the first amendment. This is so
because the order obviously is inspired by a lack of faith in the first
amendment freedoms and a fear of their exercise by persons whose
thoughts and words are understandably offensive to the establishment.
The first amendment outlaws governmental action that abridges
freedom of thought, or freedom of speech, or freedom of the press, or
freedom of association, or freedom of assembly, or freedom of petition,
or freedom of religion. These freedoms embrace and nourish a kindred
freedom, the freedom of dissent.
Each of these freedoms, which may be called first amendment
freedoms, were created to make Americans politically, intellectually,
and spiritually free. The novelist Thomas Wolfe sensed this when he
said:
So, then, to every man his chance-to every man, regardless of his
birth, his shining, golden opportunity-to every man the right to live,
to work, to be himself, and to become whatever thing his manhood and
his vision can combine to make-this, seeker, is the promise of America. I do not believe . . . that the ideas represented by "freedom of
thought," "freedom of speech," "freedom of press," and "free assem-

bly" are just rhetorical myths. I believe rather that they are among the
most valuable realities that men have gained, and that if they are
destroyed men will again fight to have them."2

The first amendment grants its freedoms to all persons within the
boundaries of our country without regard to whether they are wise or
foolish, learned or ignorant, profound or shallow, brave or timid, or
devout or ungodly, and without regard to whether they love or hate our
"Exec. Order No. 11,605, 3 C.F.R. 176 (Supp. 1971).
2
" T. WOLFE, YOU CAN'T Go HOME AGAIN 508 (1940).
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country and its institutions. Consequently, the amendment protects the
expression of all kinds of ideas, no matter how antiquated, novel, or
queer they might be. In the final analysis, the first amendment is based
upon an abiding faith that our country has nothing to fear from the
exercise of its freedoms as long as it leaves truth free to combat error.
I share this faith.
To be sure, the exercise of first amendment rights by others may
annoy us and subject us at times to tirades of intellectual or political
rubbish. This is a small price to pay, however, for the benefits which
the exercise of these rights bestows on our country.
The Nature of First Amendment Freedoms
The first amendment protects the expression of ideas, not the
commission of acts, and for this reason cannot be invoked to justify
criminal or violent deeds. It is explicit in the first amendment that the
freedom of the people to assemble to petition for the redress of grievances must be exercised peaceably; and it is implicit in it that the other
freedoms it secures must be exercised in like manner.
First amendment freedoms are simply designed to secure to the
people a constitutionally protected right to use the means that nature
and man's ingenuity afford them to express to others their thoughts,
ideas, and desires concerning government, society, religion, and all
other things under the sun. Inasmuch as expression has persuasive
power, this right must be recognized and exercised if government is to
be responsive to the will of the people and if society is to be free.
Since one of the principal purposes of the first amendment is to
make America a politically free society, it assures to every person or
group of persons the right to express publicly ideas concerning any
problems of government or society without prior restraint or fear of
subsequent punishment, even though the ideas are displeasing to government or are believed by a majority of our citizens to be false and fraught
with evil consequences.
Why did the Founding Fathers secure this right to every individual
and association and assembly within our borders? There are two answers to this question, one philosophical and the other pragmatic. As
philosophers, the Founding Fathers believed that free and full debate
teaches men the truth and frees them from the worst sort of tyranny,
tyranny over the mind; and as pragmatists, the Founding Fathers believed that free and full debate is vital to the civil and political institutions they established.
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The Founding Fathers were right on both counts. Freedom of
thought and speech are the things that distinguish our country most
sharply from totalitarian regimes. They enable our country to enjoy a
diversity of ideas and programs and to escape the standardization of
ideas and programs that totalitarian tyranny requires.
In addition, a free and full interchange of ideas concerning the
problems of government and society makes us aware of conditions and
policies that need correction, and induces us to make, in apt time and
in a peaceful way, the reforms that changing times demand. As a consequence, violent revolution has no rational or rightful place in our system.
Power of Government to Prohibit or Punish Speech
Like all freedoms, first amendment freedoms may be abused. Society is often disturbed by those who abuse these freedoms to protest,
either rightly or wrongly, conditions or policies that they deplore. Nevertheless, society must ordinarily tolerate these abuses by protestors,
however much it may hate their thoughts and words. This is true because the power of government to deal with them is limited by the first
amendment.
It is well that this is so. If protest is justified, it may lead to reform;
and if it is unjustified, protest may relieve at least temporarily the
tensions of the protestors. In either event, protest has therapeutic value
for both protestors and society.
Freedom of thought is absolute and cannot be limited or punished
by government in any way. However, other first amendment freedoms
are qualified in the sense that their exercise may be circumscribed by
government within narrow limits to protect other overriding social interests.
The general rule is that people may express their ideas freely and
associate or assemble freely to make their ideas effective. But this general rule does not prevail in respect to the exercise of speech, association, or assembly that defames others, invades the privacy of others,
constitutes obscenity, incites to crime or violence, obstructs the courts
in the administration of justice, amounts to sedition, or imperils the
national security. Government may punish by law past speech, association, or assembly falling within these narrow limits and under extraordinary circumstances may subject it to prior restraint by obtaining injunctions from courts of equity.
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Except when government acts within these narrow limits, it violates
the first amendment if it attempts to limit its freedoms by legislation.
Moreover, government violates the first amendment if it engages in
conduct that is calculated and intended to stifle the willingness of people
to exercise their freedom of speech, association, or assembly. It is to be
noted in this connection that the first amendment was written for the
timid as well as the brave.
Power of Government to Prohibitor Punish Speech Advocating Crime
or Sedition
In describing first amendment limitations on the power of Government, the Supreme Court declared in Terminiello v. Chicago that
"[f]reedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."'' 3 Thus, strange as it may
seem at first blush, the amendment protects advocacy of conduct prohibited by law unless it incites action to bring such conduct about and
creates a clear and present danger that it will provoke action to that end.
This is so because the amendment protects the expression of ideas, no
matter how reprehensible they might be.
Since the doctrine of civil disobedience is invoked with such frequency nowadays, it seems not amiss to emphasize that the Constitution
does not countenance civil disobedience that contemplates and produces
unlawful acts.
Government has an inherent right to self-protection and may under
some conditions prohibit or punish the advocacy or teaching of the
desirability of overthrowing government by violent action. Judges have
used multitudes of words in many cases to define the conditions under
which government may exercise its right to self-protection by limiting
speech, association, and assembly. While the words of some of the
judges are occasionally somewhat elusive in meaning and for that reason
difficult to comprehend, I interpret the cases to lay down these principles:
First, the first amendment protects all utterances, individual or
concerted, that advocate constitutional or political changes, however
revolutionary they may be, if the utterances contemplate that the
'3337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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changes are to be achieved by lawful means. Hence, freedom of speech
permits an individual or a group to advocate the adoption by means of
the ballot box of communism, fascism, or any other system of government.
Secondly, the first amendment also protects all utterances, individual or concerted, that advocate or teach as an abstract doctrine the
desirability of the forcible overthrow of the government. This is true
even though such advocacy or teaching is engaged in with intent to
accomplish violent overthrow and with the hope that it may ultimately
do so.
Thirdly, the first amendment affords no protection, however, to
utterances, individual or concerted, that advocate or teach action for the
forcible overthrow of government.
Finally, inasmuch as the capacity of a group to create danger is
greater than that of an individual, the law makes a distinction between
the power of government to exercise its right of self-protection against
individuals and groups. Government may prohibit or punish utterances
of an individual that advocate or teach action for the forcible overthrow
of government only if his advocacy or teaching creates a clear and
present danger that it will provoke action. But it may prohibit or punish
utterances of a group that advocate or teach action for the forcible
overthrow of government if the advocacy or teaching takes place under
circumstances reasonably justifying apprehension that the action will
occur either immediately or at a future time selected by the group.
When it enacted the Smith Act of 1940,14 Congress made it a felony
knowingly and willfully to advocate or teach the desirability of overthrowing by violence the Government of thle United States or any of its
states, territories, districts, or possessions. In construing the Smith Act,
the Supreme Court decided that the words "advocate" and "teach"
were not used by.Congress in their ordinary dictionary meanings, because they had been construed in prior cases that had interpreted similar
laws "as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation."'" By
so doing, the Supreme Court adjudged that the principles which I have
outlined were embodied in the Smith Act and in consequence such act
is not unconstitutional.
118 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
"5Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
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Sedition Laws
The Constitution expressly provides two ways to protect our country against domestic danger by civil means. Congress may make punishable as crimes dangerous acts and, subject to first amendment limitations, dangerous words. Those of us who esteem our system the best yet
devised by man may use our freedom amendment freedoms to instruct
the ignorant, convert the doubting, and combat the efforts of those who
undertake to destroy or injure it. Justice Brandeis must have had these
considerations in mind when he made this statement in his eloquent
opinion in Whitney v. California:"Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for
violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and
assembly."' 6
Since Congress was first organized as the Nation's legislature, it
has enacted the following sedition laws: the Sedition Act of 1798,"
which still lives in infamy; the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917'8
and 1918,11 which Attorney General Palmer grossly abused in his
"witch-hunts" after the First World War; and the Smith Act of 1940, °
the potentiality for abuse of which has been restricted by Supreme Court
cases that subject its broad language to first amendment limitations.
Each of these acts was adopted in a time of great national strain.
By each of these laws, Congress made utterances that it deemed dangerous to the common weal punishable as crimes and thus secured to all
against whom the laws were invoked the right to trial by an impartial
jury of the vicinage and the other protections crdated by the Constitution to prevent the punishment of the innocent.
Fears of Communism
From the time of the Russian Revolution until the day on which
Russia became an ally of the United States in the Second World War,
multitudes of Americans entertained profound fears in respect to the
menace that they believed communism presented to peace abroad and
security at home. As a result of Russia's intransigence in Europe and
U.S. 357, 378 (1927).
" Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
"RAct of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
"2Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553.
2018 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
1274
7
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the communist takeover of mainland China after the end of the war,
these fears were revived and intensified, and they rightly remain until
this day insofar as they are based on concern over the threat which
communism poses to world peace. Inasmuch as they were based on
concern for domestic security, the fears of communism persisted with
intensity until the mid-1950's, and they still linger on in some quarters.
There is room for dispute as to how substantial the communist
threat to our domestic security actually was during the times when it
was feared most. There was some tangible evidence and plethoric surmise that communists had strongly infiltrated segments of the labor
movement and had even penetrated government and the armed forces
to a degree. The extent of the threat was exaggerated by a tendency on
the part of the fearful to believe that persons of unorthodox views were
tainted with communism.
Anyway, the fear of the threat to domestic security produced two
pieces of major congressional legislation-the Smith Act of 1940,21
which has already been mentioned, and the Internal Security Act of
1950,22 which Congress passed over President Truman's veto.
The Subversive Activities Control Board
Before the Internal Security Act of 1950 was adopted, our country
steadfastly adhered to the principle that government ought not to punish
anyone for anything except a crime of which he has been convicted in a
constitutionally conducted trial in a court of justice. However, the Internal Security Act injected into our system a novel concept which is alien
to this principle. This concept may be summarized in the following way:
in order to protect society, our country should maintain a governmental
agency to stigmatize publicly organizations that the government considers intellectually or politically dangerous 2 3 and to visit upon such organizations and their members severe penalties.
The Internal Security Act of 1950 created the Subversive Activities
Control Board. By the original act and an amendment of 1954,4 the
Board was given jurisdiction to act on petitions of the Attorney General
21

id.

-50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1970).
23 use the phrase "intellectually or politically dangerous" to distinguish the stigmatized
organizations and their members from organizations and individuals whose illegally dangerous acts
or words are punishable as crimes under constitutional safeguards.
2150 U.S.C. §§ 792, 792a (1970).
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to identify and require the public registration of communist-action,
communist-front, and communist-infiltrated organizations, and
members of communist-action organizations.
The act as amended automatically imposed severe penalties upon
the organizations and the members of the organizations stigmatized by
the Board. For example, a stigmatized organization was denied the use
of instrumentalities of communication unless it plainly revealed that
they were being used by it and that it was a communist organization;
and a member of a stigmatized organization was denied the right to hold
office or employment with any labor organization subject to the National Labor Relations Act, the right to obtain or use a passport, and
the right to hold any nonelective office or employment under the United
States or even to seek such office or employment or employment in any
defense facility without revealing his membership in the organization.
In Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities

Control Board 5 the Supreme Court adjudged, in essence, that Congress
had the constitutional power to regulate the registration of communist
organizations because of its finding that such organizations advocated
or taught action for the forcible overthrow of government. It ruled,
however, in other cases that the procedures prescribed by the act to
effect the compulsory registration of communist organizations violated
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment and that major
provisions of the act relating to membership in communist organizations imposed penalties upon individuals on the theory of guilt by association and could not be reconciled with the first amendment." These
latter rulings left the Subversive Activities Control Board with virtually
nothing it could constitutionally do.
By an amendment of January 2, 1968, Congress undertook to
revive the moribund agency by repealing the compulsory-registration
provisions of the Internal Security Act and by conferring upon the
Board power to issue declaratory orders determining whether organizations that it investigates are communist-action, communist-front, or
communist-infiltrated organizations and whether individuals whom it
investigates are members of communist-action organizations.
However, the revival was short lived. On December 12, 1969, the
-367 U.S. 1 (1961).
2
GId.
"Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, 81 Stat. 765, amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-84, 78692a, 794 (1970).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit handed down
Boorda v. Subversive Activities Control Board,8 in which the court held
that the provisions of the Internal Security Act and its amendments
allowing public disclosure of an individual's membership in a
communist-action organization without finding that the individual concerned shares in any illegal purposes of the organization to which he
belongs violates the first 'amendment. The Supreme Court refused to
review this ruling, and the Board found itself left once again with virtually nothing it could constitutionally do.
Record of the Board
Consider the record of the Board during the twenty-one years of
its existence. During these twenty-one years, the Board has found only
one communist-action organization in all America, and that was the
Communist Party itself. It was not even able, by constitutional methods,
to impose registration upon it.
During these twenty-one years, the Attorney General filed petitions
which alleged that twenty-two other organizations were communistfront or communist-infiltrated. Eight of these petitions were dismissed
by the Board, and the other fourteen came to naught because the organizations had ceased to exist or the Board was unable for other reasons
to compel their registration.
During these twenty-one years, the Attorney General filed petitions
which alleged that sixty-six individuals-that is, sixty-six persons out of
about two hundred million Americans-were members of communistaction organizations. These petitions were frustrated in large measure
by the Boorda case and other decisions.
As one who loves America and hates communism, I take much
comfort from the ineffective record of the Board. It corroborates my
conviction that despite its enormous efforts to peddle its shoddy ideas,
communism has made few sales in America.
President Nixon's Attempt to Revive the Board
On July 2, 1971, President Nixon issued Executive Order No.
11605,29 which attempts to confer on the Subversive Activities Control
Board vast power to harass and stigmatize Americans. President
21421 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
213 C.F.R. 176 (Supp. 1971).
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Nixon's order purports to amend Executive Order No. 10450,30 which
was issued by President Eisenhower on April 27, 1953, to establish
loyalty and security requirements for government employment. Hence,
one must understand what power the executive department has in this
area.
As Justice Frankfurter declared in his concurring opinion in Garner
v. Los Angeles Board:
The Constitution does not guarantee government employment. City,
State and Nation are not confined to making provisions appropriate
for securing competent professional discharge of the functions pertaining to diverse governmental jobs. They may also assure themselves of
fidelity to the very presuppositions of our scheme of government on
the part of those who seek to serve it. No unit of government can be
denied the right to keep out of its employ those who seek to overthrow
the government by force or violence, or3 are knowingly members of an
organization engaged in such endeavor'.
President Eisenhower's executive order applies only to persons who
are presently enjoying or presently seeking employment in federal executive departments and agencies and requires the Civil Service Commission, the employing department or agency, or the FBI to investigate
matters relating to them as individuals, including their individual memberships in subversive organizations, which are relevant to the determination of whether the employment or retention in employment of each
of them is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
Hence, the Eisenhower order establishes forthright and circumscribed
procedures for insuring the loyalty of federal civil servants. Moreover,
it merely implements powers vested in the President by the Constitution
and Acts of Congress relating to government employment.
President Nixon's executive order is a different kettle of fish. To
be sure, it professes to be a mere amendment to the Eisenhower order,
and it does alter that order in one or more insignificant respects. Yet,
the major provisions of President Nixon's executive order represent, in
reality, an attempt on his part to amend the Internal Security Act of
1950 by bestowing upon the Subversive Activities Control Board new,
sweeping powers far in excess of those that Congress sought to give it.
To this end, the Nixon order declares in express terms that the

-3 C.F.R. 936 (1953).
31341 U.S. 716, 724-25 (1951) (concurring opinion).
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Board shall henceforth possess and exercise the power to conduct, on
petition of the Attorney General, hearings to determine whether any of
the innumerable organizations that claim the membership of millions of
Americans who do not enjoy or seek federal employment are totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive organizations; organizations
which have the policy "of unlawfully advocating the commission of acts
of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
or laws of the United States or of any State;"3 or organizations "which
seek to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or
'33
subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
The Nixon order further declares that in making its determinations
the Board shall have power to investigate the activities and objectives
of every group in America which commits acts of force or violence; or
unlawfully damages or destroys property or injures persons; or violates
laws "pertaining to treason, rebellion or insurrection, riots or civil disorders, seditious conspiracy, sabotage, trading with the enemy, obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, imped'34
ing officers of the United States, or related crimes or offenses.
Finally, the Nixon order provides that the Attorney General will
transmit to each federal executive department or agency the names of
all organizations condemned by the Subversive Activities Control Board
for the use of the department or agency in determining whether persons
enjoying or seeking employment by it should be employed or retained
in employment."
It is manifest, however, that the real objective of the order is to
empower the Board to brand the specified organizations and groups as
intellectually or politically dangerous to the established government. It
is equally as manifest that such branding of these organizations and
groups will place a political or social stigma on their members and tend
to minimize their exercise of freedom of speech, association, and assembly.
I submit that the provisions of the Nixon order that purport to
confer new powers on the Board have no legal force for the following
reasons: (1) their promulgation is beyond the constitutional power of the
President and is a direct violation of the doctrine of separation of pow323 C.F.R. 176 (Supp. 1971).
=Id.
31
1d. at 177.
3Id.
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ers; (2) they are void for overbreadth; and (3) they violate the first
amendment and due process rights of all the members of the organizations or groups designated except those who share the illegal aims of
the organizations or groups.
What was said by the Supreme Court in respect to President Truman's executive order in the steel-seizure case, Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,36 makes it plain that in attempting to expand the
power of the Board President Nixon undertook to make law: "The
President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed
in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy
be executed in a manner prescribed by the President." 7 It necessarily
follows that the major provisions of the Nixon order are void under
sections one and eight of article I of the Constitution, which give Congress all of the lawmaking power of the Federal Government and deny
any of it to the President.
I do not question the power of the President under the Constitution
and acts of Congress governing federal employment to establish by
executive order procedures to assure the loyalty of federal civil servants.
But I do assert with confidence that even if the Nixon order were a bona
fide effort to accommplish that objective, it would be void for overbreadth. This is because the order brings within its coverage the organizational memberships of millions of Americans who neither enjoy nor
seek employment in the federal establishment. Moreover, it applies to
the activities and objectives of groups past numbering which have no
relationship whatever to the loyalty of federal civil servants. The President has no power to subject the organizational memberships, activities,
or objectives of all Americans to the scrutiny of the Subversive Activities Control Board because some of them may be employed by the
Federal Government or some of them may hereafter seek employment
by it.
The Nixon order also violates the first amendment and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment by applying the theory of guilt
by association and by stigmatizing politically and socially all of the
members of all the organizations or groups branded by the Subversive
Activities Control Board, including those who may be passive or inactive members of such organizations or groups, those who may be una36343 U.S. 579 (1952).

"Id. at 588.
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ware of the unlawful aims of such organizations or groups, or those who
may disagree with the unlawful aims.
While I do not care to belabor the points, a pretty good case can
also be made for the proposition that some of the powers that the order
attempts to allot to the Board trespass upon areas that the Constitution
reserves to the states, and others offend the first amendment principle
that government cannot touch the mere advocacy of ideas, no matter
how reprehensible they may be.
Apart from its constitutional infirmities, President Nixon's executive order is to be deplored because it has no rightful place in our land.
It is not the function of government in a free society to protect its
citizens against thoughts or associations that it deems dangerous or to
stigmatize its citizens for thoughts or associations that it thinks hazardous. Yet that is exactly what the executive order undertakes to empower
the Subversive Activities Control Board to do.
If America is to be free, her Government must permit her people
to think their own thoughts and determine their own associations without official instruction or intimidation; and if America is to be secure,
her Government must punish her people for the crimes they commit not
for the thoughts they think or the associations they choose.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: EVERY MAN'S HOME

Is His CASTLE

The deepest hunger of the human heart is for a home in which one
may have privacy, exercise personal liberty, and enjoy safety free from
unjustifiable intrusions by government or law-breakers. Ages ago the
Prophet Micah pictured this hunger with eloquence by describing the
mountain of the Lord as a place where "they shall sit every man under
his vine and under his fig tree, and none shall make them afraid
"38

When the common law of England was emerging from the mists
of history, it undertook to satisfy this hunger by declaring that every
man's home is his castle and that every man may resist to the utmost
unidentified persons who undertake to enter his home against his will.
This principle of the common law was judicially recognized and applied
in Semayne's Case, which was decided in 1604 and which declares: "The
house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as for his
3'Micah 4:4.
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defense against injury and violence as for his repose . . .31
This principle of law is not absolute as against government. It must
yield on rare occasions if an overriding public purpose demands that
government make an entry into a home. But even on those rare occasions, government may enter only if it uses means which insure that its
power to enter is not abused.
In recognition of this principle, the court further declared in
Semayne's Case:
In all cases where the King is party, the Sheriff (if the doors be not
open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other
execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But
before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and
to make requests to open doors."
In opposing a proposal to collect an excise on cider by methods which
abridged the concept embodied in the maxim that every man's home is
his castle, William Pitt, the elder, expressed the veneration of Englishmen for the principle of law embodied in such a concept by this statement in the House of Commons:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow
through it-the storm may enter-the rain may enter-but the King
of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold
of the ruined tenement!"
When the colonists migrated from England to America, they
brought with them a proud attachment to this principle of the common
law. Hence, it is not surprising that the people of Boston rebelled when
officers of the British Crown entered and ransacked their homes and
places of business under general warrants to collect taxes imposed upon
them by Parliament. This outrage was one of the tyrannies that provoked the American Revolution.
After Independence was won, the Founding Fathers incorporated
this principle of the common law in the fourth amendment, which reads
as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
177 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
40Md.
"Speech by William Pitt the Elder, quoted in BARTLErr's
ed. 1967).

FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS

426 (14th
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and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."2
The fourth amendment protects the occupant of a house from an
unannounced entry by an officer of the law. Even though he has a legal
right to enter a house to make a lawful arrest or to execute a lawful
search warrant, an officer is prohibited by the amendment from attempting to do so unless he first announces his identity and purpose to
the occupant and is refused admittance by him. This requirement has
this two-fold objective: (1) to protect the privacy, personal liberty, and
safety of the occupant; and (2) to protect the officer from the danger of
violent injury or death at the hands of the occupant, who might otherwise mistake him for a burglar.
The requirement of prior announcement of identity and purpose is
subject to limited exceptions, which are stated in Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Ker v. California.4 3 The opinion rightly asserts
that the fourth amendment is violated by an unannounced entry of
officers into a house:
except (1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority and purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief
that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where
those within, made aware of the presence of someone outside (because,
for example, there has been a knock at the door) are then engaged in
activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted.44
Manifestly, the facts that call any of these exceptions into play cannot
be known to an officer until he arrives at the house in which the arrest
or search is to be made.
Crime and dangerous drugs present hard problems. Yet, hard problems are the quicksands of sound legislation.
In 1970, Congress enacted two "no-knock" laws. One of them is
embodied in the District of Columbia Court Reform Act 5 and regulates
arrests and search warrants for all purposes in the District of Columbia;
ZU.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43374 U.S. 23, 48 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
11
1d. at 47.
"SDistrict of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODL
I to -1705 (Supp. IV, 1971).

§§23-
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the other is incorporated in the Drug Control Act 6 and regulates search
warrants for discovery of dangerous drugs or controlled substances as
defined in the Act throughout the country.
The District of Columbia Act contains two unprecedented provisions. One of them empowers a judicial officer to confer upon a law
enforcement officer express authority to break and enter any dwelling
house or other building in the District in order to execute an arrest
warrant without giving the occupants notice of his identity and purpose
if the judicial officer finds that "such notice is likely to enable the party
to be arrested to escape. '4 7 The second provision empowers a judicial
officer to confer upon a law enforcement officer express authority to
break and enter any dwelling house or other building in the District in
order to execute an arrest warrant without giving the occupants notice
of his identity and purpose if the judicial officer finds that "such notice
is likely to enable the party to be arrested to escape. ' 47 The second
provision empowers a judicial officer to confer upon a law enforcement
officer express authority to break and enter any dwelling house or other
building in the District to execute a search warrant without giving the
occupants notice of his identity and purpose if the judicial officer finds
(a) that "such notice is likely to result in the evidence subject to seizure
being easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of," 48 or (b) that "such
notice is likely to endanger the life or safety of the officer or another
person," 49 or (c) that "such notice would be a useless gesture.""0
The Drug Control Act empowers a federal judicial officer to confer
upon a law enforcement officer express authority to break and enter any
building to execute a search warrant for the discovery of dangerous
drugs or controlled substances without giving the occupants notice of
his authority and purpose if the judicial officer finds (a) that "the property sought may and, if such notice is given, will be easily and quickly
destroyed or disposed of,"'" or (b) that "the giving of such notice will
immediately endanger the life or safety of the executing officer or another person. .... ,,52
"Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970).
"D.C. CODE § 23-591(c)(2)(C) (Supp. IV, 1971), referred to at id. § 23-561(b)(1) (Supp. IV,

1971).

4

91d. § 23-591(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1971), referred to at id. § 23-521(f)(6) (Supp. IV,
4Id. § 23-591(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1971), referred to at id. § 23-521(l)(6) (Supp. IV,
50Id. § 23-591(c)(2)(D) (Supp. IV, 1971), referred to at id. § 23-521(f)(6) (Supp. IV,
5"Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act § 509(b)(1)(A), 21

§ 879(b)(I)(A) (1970).
521d. § 509(b)(I)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 879(b)(1)(B) (1970).

1971).
1971).
1971).
U.S.C.
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In attempting thus to abrogate the constitutional obligation of an
officer to give notice of his identity and purpose before he undertakes
to break and enter a house to make an arrest or search, these no-knock
statutes offend the letter, the spirit, and the purpose of the fourth
amendment. Neither Congress nor any official acting under its authority can nullify a constitutional requirement on the ground that obedience
to it "would be a useless gesture." The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be made to hang on such an arbitrary and
brittle thread. Moreover, these no-knock laws do not bring the unprecedented powers they attempt to create within any of the exceptions to the
fourth amendment requirement of prior notice of identity and purpose.
To be sure, they pay lip service to the fourth amendment by stating that
the extraordinary warrants cannot be issued except upon probable
cause. However, probable cause can be established only by facts that
exist and are made known to a judicial officer at the time he acts on an
application for an arrest or search warrant. It cannot be predicated upon
prophesies or suspicions or fears as to what the conduct of the occupants
of a distant house may be at some future time when an officer of the
law reaches the premises to make an arrest or search. Hence, there can
really be no probable cause for the issuance of the extraordinary warrants that the no-knock laws undertake to sanction.
Even apart from constitutional considerations, no-knock laws are
bad. If a nation's people are to have respect for law, the nation must
have respectable laws, and no law is respectable if it authorizes officers
to act like burglars and robs the people of the only means they have for
determining whether those who seek to invade their habitations violently
or by stealth are officers or burglars.
When the Drug Control Act was under Senate consideration, I
moved to strike the no-knock provision from it. I predicted at that time
that its implementation would result in the deaths of both law enforcement officers and householders. Unfortunately, this unhappy prediction
has materialized on a number of occasions.
I do not condemn no-knock laws in ignorance of the terrible toll
which crime and dangerous drugs exact from society. Dangerous drugs
doom those who become addicted to them, shatter the happiness of the
families of the addicts, and provoke much of the crime that haunts our
land. The evil and selfish men who traffic in dangerous drugs for filthy
lucre and bring these tragedies to pass deserve the harshest punishment
the law sanctions.
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Despite these things, I cling to an abiding conviction that it is better
for lawmakers to permit some wrongdoers to escape than it is for them
to sacrifice upon the altar of fear and doubt the age-old boast of AngloAmerican law that every man's home is his castle. A freedom sacrificed
is seldom resurrected.

